6.结论

   环境经济学家在环境管制是否对企业行为造成积极或消极的影响没有造成共识。一些学者认为，企业是低成本求职者，因此，减少活动，他们都面临着紧张的环保标准（污染避难所假说）。其他的，相反，强调（清洁）自然资源的作用和生产过程中的创新技术（要素禀赋假说和波特假说）。根据这种观点，环境监管应该在一定程度上促进公司的活动。

   在本文中，我们专注于投资决策和评估国家特定行业的投资是如何受环境的影响。我们分析了四种类型的投资：在有形商品的总投资，在新建筑总投资，在机械和生产性投资（投资于有形商品减排技术零下投资）。环境管制是作为（i）总电流环境支出保护，和（ii）从环境税的收入来测量的。

   我们的数据集涵盖了来自21个欧洲国家的行业的特定信息和9个制造行业（食品，饮料和烟草;纺织品和纺织产品，皮革制品;木材和木材产品;纸浆，纸和纸制品;焦炭，精炼石油产品和核燃料;化工，橡胶和塑料制品;其他非金属矿产产品; 基本金属及其他制造业）1998年到2007年之间。

我们的实证研究结果可以推导出关于一个一致的画面关于投资环境严格性的影响。两者来自环境税的总支出和收入在所有类型的国家特定行业投资产生积极的影响。但是，这两个变量的二次项输入显著阴性，这表明对环境的积极影响调控正在减少伴随着更严格的限制。平均而言，我们发现约0.15支出弹性环保，大约有0.12收入来自环境税。换句话说，在支出增加10％环保（来自环境收益税收）与增加有关（国家特定行业）投资约1.5（1.2）％左右。乍看之下，我们来自欧洲国家和行业的证据似乎与以前美国的研究发现矛盾。

剩下的问题是，这些调查结果如何适应上述所提的理论关于环境对企业行为的影响。至于我们的国家特定行业证据可以推断到企业层面的行为，积极的参数估计在环境监管的测量上支持了波特和要素禀赋的假设。此正面影响可能表明出现了比较优势，从有效利用的/处理的天然资源（即，更高的资源由于消耗较少量的可用资源在生产过程中，更好的质量由于污染少），作为一种环境法规的反映。然而，其二次项系数表明，无论是波特还是要素禀赋假设，如果环境不成立，成本以符合环保标准相对高相比，他们的优势。毕竟，显示在本文中的证据，并不完全确认上述所提及的某个理论关于环境管制对FDI企业投资的影响。

外文文献出处：生态经济学附外文文献原文

1. Introduction

  Environmental economists typically arrive at very different conclusions about the economic effects of environmental regulation. For instance, one argument that has recently attracted increasing attention is that firms intend to locate their business activities in countries or regions where environmental standards are relatively natural resources as factor inputs. In this case, one would expect a positive rather than a negative impact of environmental regulation on firm activities.

  This paper analyzes the role of environmental regulation on industry-specific investment in European countries. Unlike the previous literature mainly focusing on the effects of environmental regulation on international investment (i.e., location choices of multinational firms), we ask whether tighter environmental standards are associated with higher or lower investment at a given location.1 Specifically, we are interested in the differential impact of environmental stringency on four types of country-industry-specific investment: (i) gross investment in tangible goods, (ii) gross investment in construction and alteration of buildings (henceforth investment in new buildings), (iii) gross investment in machinery, and (iv) ‘productive’ investment, defined as the difference between gross investment in tangible goods minus investment in abatement technologies. Environmental regulation is measured as (i) an industry's total current expenditures on environmental protection,and (ii) a country-industry's revenue from environmental taxes.Empirically, we rely on a sample of nine manufacturing industries at the NACE 2-digit level in 21 European countries between 1998 and 2007. This represents the lowest level of aggregation for environmental regulation available for a broader cross section of European countries.